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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: 
This chapter explains how economic analysis can contribute to the delineation of 
the lone wolf’s opportunities and choices in a manner that allows operationally 
relevant advice to be contributed to the investigative process.  
Approach: 
Using a risk-reward analytical framework we examine the lone wolf’s attack 
method opportunities and choices and identify those attack methods that would be 
chosen by lone wolves with different levels of risk aversion. We also use prospect 
theory as an alternative methodology for the determination of the lone wolf’s 
preference orderings over the available attack methods in a context where he 
references his actions against those of a predecessor whom he wishes to emulate.  
Findings: 
We find that lone wolf terrorists with different levels of risk aversion can be 
expected to choose different attack methods or combinations of attack methods. 
More risk averse lone wolf terrorists will choose attack methods such as 
assassination. Less risk averse lone wolf terrorists will choose attack methods such 
as bombing, hostage-taking and unconventional attacks. Also, we find that lone wolf 
terrorists who reference their actions against ‘predecessor’ lone wolf terrorists will 
choose differently from among the available attack methods depending on which 
predecessor lone wolf is being referenced.  
Limitations: 
The analysis provides two different perspectives on terrorist choice but by no means 
exhausts the analytical alternatives. The analysis focuses on the fatalities and 
injuries inflicted whereas other perspectives might include different ‘payoffs’ series, 
including news or media coverage.  
Originality: 
The chapter contributes an analysis of the order in which lone wolf terrorists with 
particular characteristics will choose from a set of available attack methods. 
During the course of our discussion we point out the consistency between the ‘rise’ 
of the lone wolf terrorist and the diseconomies to scale that are evident within the 
terrorism context. This presents the opportunity for new debates.   
Keywords: Lone wolf terrorism; Lone wolf terrorist; Economic analysis; 
Investigative process; Risk aversion; Opportunities; Choices; Attack methods; 
Prospect theory; Preferences. 
JEL Classification: H56, D74, D81  
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of the ways in which economics may be helpful in the pre-
emption, pursuit and apprehension of the lone wolf terrorist. The ‘true’ or ‘pure’ lone wolf terrorist operates 
alone, outside of any command structure or formal organisation. He presents a challenge to law enforcement 
because his independence makes it difficult to detect evidence of his existence before he strikes. Lone wolf 
terrorists do not have a network that can be infiltrated by government security agencies. Even the ‘quasi’ lone 
wolf terrorist who engages in some level of interaction with known potential terrorists or maintains some links 
with extremist organisations will be more difficult to identify, track and apprehend prior to an attack than those 
who choose to operate within a formal command structure and information and supply network. We must not 
fall into the trap of thinking that a single individual cannot obtain the information and materials required to 
inflict human tragedy upon civilians. Most lone wolf attacks have been relatively crude in terms of the materials 
required but have sometimes demonstrated sophistication in planning that rivals or exceeds that of known 
terrorist groups. Some lone terrorists have inflicted more injuries and fatalities than many terrorist groups.  
 
For these reasons, the lone wolf terrorist has figured prominently in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 
strategic planning for almost a decade. The then FBI’s (Acting) General Counsel, Patrick Rowan, highlighted 
the threat of lone wolf terrorism in testimony before the House Intelligence Committee in 2003 (Webster 
Commission, 2012, p. 9). In 2011, both the President of the United States, Barack Obama, and the U.S. 
Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano named lone wolf terrorism as the greatest threat to be guarded 
against. According to the Associated Press, Janet Napolitano said, “The risk of ‘lone wolf’ attackers, with no 
ties to known extremist networks or grand conspiracies, is on the rise as the global terrorist threat has shifted.” 
She was quoted as saying, “There’s been a lot of evolution over the past three years. The thing that’s most 
noticeable to me is the growth of the lone wolf” (Associated Press, 2011).  
 
The recent attention that lone wolf terrorism has received from governments and their security agencies should 
not lead us to overlook the long history of lone wolf terrorism in both the United States and Europe. Indeed, if 
lone wolf terrorism is a ‘rising threat’, then there is certainly an argument to be made that the threat has been 
rising for a long time. The narrative of lone wolf terrorism stretches back at least several decades. In the United 
States between 1978 and 1999, 26 percent of the victims of terrorism were victims of lone wolf terrorism and 
the number of recorded incidences of lone wolf terrorism rose from just 2 during the 1960s to 13 in the 1990s 
(Spaaij, 2010, pp. 859-860). 30 cases of lone wolf terrorism were reported in the U.S. between 1968 and 2007. 
Over the same period 9 cases were reported in Germany, 7 in France, 6 in Spain and 5 in Italy
2
. The actions of 
Anders Behring Breivik in July 2011, which resulted in the deaths of 77 people, became the most deadly 
incidence of lone wolf terrorism, overshadowing the 18 fatalities attributed to the actions of Joseph Paul 
Franklin in the U.S. in the 1970s. 
 
What makes the challenge facing law enforcement more acute is the absence of any particular ‘profile’ for lone 
wolf terrorists. Lone wolves often hold ‘extreme’ views but different lone wolves hold these extreme views 
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 Though when Europe is considered as a whole, there were 38 lone wolves active during the period throughout 
Europe (Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement, 2007).    
about different things and many people with extreme views do not end up expressing them violently in an act of 
terrorism. A number of cases of lone wolf terrorism in the United States have apparently been motivated by 
extreme views on race and abortion. Racially motivated acts of terrorism have been among the most deadly 
instances of lone wolf terrorism. For example, Joseph Paul Franklin, a white supremacist who engaged in a 
series of racially motivated shootings between the late 1970s and early 1980s, killed 18 and injured 5 people and 
Mark Essex, a black militant, accumulated an identical number of victims—though with 10 fatalities and 13 
injuries—in a one week spree of violence in 1973. Ten of Essex’s victims were police officers, whom he 
deliberately targeted in an attack on the New Orleans P.D. on New Year’s Eve 1972. One officer was killed and 
one injured in the initial attack. Others were killed or wounded in the ensuing pursuit along with several 
civilians. Franklin is currently serving multiple life sentences for his crimes. Essex was shot and killed by police 
on January 7 1973, one week after his initial attack.  
 
Neither the backgrounds nor motivations of lone wolf terrorists reveal any strongly discernible patterns. Indeed, 
it is hard to construct a representative ‘profile’ for lone wolf terrorists in general. Just about the only thing that 
lone wolves appear to have in common is that nearly all lone wolf terrorists have been male. Rachelle Shannon, 
an anti-abortion activist who shot and wounded a doctor in Wichita, Kansas, is the only female to engage in an 
act of lone wolf terrorism in the United States. Beyond this, the characteristics and motivations of lone wolf 
terrorists are divergent enough to prevent a profile for an archetype lone wolf from being constructed. This is 
essentially the same situation that has been found to characterise terrorists in general and far-reaching and 
comprehensive analysis of offenders from psychological and socio-economic-environmental perspectives have 
failed to identify any finite list of things that terrorists have in common (Rasch, 1979; Victoroff, 2005). This 
being said, work is ongoing in defining and refining the categories of lone wolf terrorism and it might still be 
possible that within particular sub-sets of motivations patterns will emerge that will help to develop a typology 
of the characteristic lone wolf offender.  
 
One of the most recent and most deadly acts of lone wolf terrorism in the United States occurred on November 5 
2009 when Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army Major, used two pistols to kill 13 people—12 U.S. soldiers and 1 
Department of Defence employee—and injure 43 others in a shooting spree at the U.S. Army base in Fort Hood, 
Texas. The William H. Webster Commission, which was established to investigate the FBI’s responses to pieces 
of intelligence obtained prior to the shooting, has further highlighted the challenges that lone wolf offenders 
present to law enforcement agencies. On the face of it, events such as 9/11 and the Fort Hood shootings may 
lead us to the conclusion that ‘religious extremism’, particularly of the Islamic type, is a prominent category of 
modern lone wolf terrorism within which most potential lone wolf terrorists can be grouped and on which law 
enforcement efforts can be concentrated. However, the Commission’s report highlights the fact that Islamic 
religious extremism has accounted for only 7 percent of terrorist incidences in the United States. The two other 
overarching categories of extremism, ‘political’ and ‘social’, are much more significant. This, of course, 
highlights immediately the problem of classifying lone wolf terrorists. The task would be easy if most of them 
could be placed within the category of ‘religious extremists’ and further classified into the subset Islamic 
extremism. When political and social extremism are dominant overarching categories, each with diverse subsets 
of motivations, the task of deciding which types of behaviour will attract law enforcement attention is more 
complex.  
 
The purpose of the FBI’s model of the radicalisation process, which is consistent with similar models developed 
in Coolsaet (2011) and Ranstorp (2010), is to determine a set of ‘indicators’ that identify a potential lone wolf 
terrorist before he strikes. The model is relatively straightforward (Webster Commission, 2012, p. 8): 
 
Pre-radicalisation → Identification → Indoctrination → Action 
 
This involves a dual challenge. First, the radicalisation of a particular ‘lone’ individual may not be observable 
prior to action. Second, even if there are some observable indicators of radicalisation, these may or may not be 
‘actionable’ within the legal and constitutional frameworks that exist. As the Webster Commission’s report 
clearly states, radicalisation is not a crime. Evidence that the potential offender is planning a violent action is 
required before an individual can be taken into custody. One important reason to justify a heightened level of 
concern about the potential for lone wolf terrorism perpetrated by radicalised or extremist individuals is that the 
process of radicalisation may be becoming less visible, more multifaceted in its origins and faster in its 
evolution towards violent action. The last two stages of the radicalisation process are known to proceed with 
greater pace than the first two but growing prominence of the Internet as a means to obtain and distribute 
information at little or no cost and hidden amongst large volumes of other electronic information may contribute 
to both a general acceleration in and ‘cloaking’ of all four stages of radicalisation making it even more difficult 
to detect a lone wolf terrorist before he engages in a violent action (Webster Commission, 2012, p. 10).   
 
Economic analysis can contribute several things to investigative processes designed to pre-empt and pursue the 
lone wolf terrorist. Fundamentally, economics is about ‘opportunities’ and ‘choices’. It is a set of analytical 
tools and theoretical frameworks that are used to identify the opportunities that individuals face—called the 
‘opportunity set’—and the choices that they make from the available opportunities. Applied to the analysis of 
terrorism, economic analysis will focus on determining the opportunities and choices that terrorists face. 
Because violent actions are the most pernicious actions of ‘radicalised’ or ‘extremist’ individuals and because 
these actions are those which law enforcement efforts are most concerned with pre-empting, it is useful to 
consider those opportunities and choices that are relevant to violent action and its consequences. In doing so, it 
becomes possible to align ‘rational’ choice with ‘most dangerous’ choice. If the terrorist makes a mistake, his 
actual choice will be less dangerous than that which we have prepared to face.  
 
Traditionally, economic analysis has tended to avoid investigating the underlying motivations of terroristic 
individuals, leaving that side of things to the psychologists (see Chapter 5 within this volume). Given what we 
have said about the difficulties experienced in the attempts to identify a set of discernible characteristics for ‘the 
terrorist’ this might have been quite wise. However, it is important to note that the boundary between economics 
and psychology is becoming less and less demarcated as time goes by. Over the past two decades, work in both 
disciplines has reflected work in the other. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have shown that significant 
psychological concepts such as identity can be encompassed within traditional economic analysis. Our 
economic approach is flexible enough to be adjusted for important results generated within psychology and 
should it one day be determined that the lone wolf terrorist is characterised by a particular set of psychological-
economic-sociological features, this would be a positive development that would expand the horizons of even 
the most orthodox economic analysis of terrorism. This being said, we shall explore some non-orthodox models 
of choice emanating from behavioural economics, especially prospect theory, and the ways in which it might be 
relevant to the investigative process that aims to pre-empt and pursue the lone wolf terrorist. 
 
THE DISECONOMIES OF TERRORISM 
Let us begin with a discussion of a more overarching subject. That is, the place for lone wolf terrorism within 
the terrorism context. In fact, two prominent features of the terrorism context are consistent with each other. 
These two features are, on the one hand, the existence of lone wolf terrorism or terrorism at the smallest possible 
scale of operation and, on the other hand, the absence of evidence for economies of scale as it pertains to 
terrorist groups. Just as we find strong evidence for economies of scale in the tendency for business organisation 
to become larger in scale with independent operators and small-sized firms superseded and replaced by larger 
corporations (see Viner, 1932 and Lucas, 1978), we observe evidence for diseconomies of scale in the absence 
of this tendency within the terrorism context (Phillips 2011). The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) contains 
many thousands of data entries referring to terrorist groups that, with very few exceptions, never reached 
beyond a small number of members and supporters. During the period 2000 to 2008, there were 400 different 
active terrorist groups involved in some form of terrorism that inflicted injuries and fatalities. Over time many 
terrorist groups fade away and are replaced by others. 
 
Table 1. Number of Terrorist Groups Involved in Acts of Violence Each Year3. 
Year Number of Groups Involved in Acts of 
Violence 
2000 103 
2001 26 
2002 95 
2003 26 
2004 67 
2005 111 
2006 99 
2007 99 
2008 165 
 
Within the terrorism context, there is a positive relationship between average fatalities inflicted by terrorist 
attacks and the variability of those fatalities over time. Variability reflects the risk to the terrorist that the actual 
outcome of a terrorist attack will be different, higher or lower, than that which was expected. Attacks that are 
expected to inflict more fatalities on average are also more risky or variable in their outcomes. In 2008, for 
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example, there were 106 terrorist groups which inflicted one or more fatalities. The five groups with the highest 
average number of fatalities across the twelve months of 2008 and five groups with a lower average number of 
fatalities across the twelve months of 2008 are listed in Table 2. The groups with the highest average also 
experienced the highest amount of variability in the outcomes of their terrorist activities. The monthly 
correlation between the monthly average fatalities inflicted by each group and the level of monthly standard 
deviation that characterised the outcomes of the group’s terrorist activities was 0.90 in 2008. This relationship is 
reflected in the aggregate data year after year (see Appendix A).  
 
Table 2. Average Monthly Fatalities and Risk: Terrorist Groups 20084. 
Terrorist Group Average Fatalities Per Month Risk (Standard Deviation) 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 12 38.527 
Al-Qa`ida 5.875 14.058 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 5.739 10.811 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 7.451 10.340 
Deccan Mujahideen 2.178 7.546 
Caucasus Emirate 0.333 0.888 
Terai Army 0.306 0.870 
Madhesi People Rights Forum (MPRF) 0.250 0.866 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 0.250 0.866 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) 0.308 0.861 
 
The important thing about this relationship between variability or risk and the outcomes of terrorists’ violent 
actions is that it varies considerably from terrorist group to terrorist group. Some groups ‘dominate’ others by 
inflicting a higher average number of fatalities upon civilians than other groups while experiencing a lower 
amount of variability (Sharpe, 1966, p. 123). The outcomes of these groups’ attacks are more deadly and more 
certain. Comparing simple averages unadjusted for risk or variability overlooks this fact. A statistic that 
accounts for the amount of variability experienced by terrorist groups relative to the average fatalities inflicted 
by their attacks is the fatalities-to-variability ratio. This is the ratio of the average fatalities inflicted by a terrorist 
group to the variability of those fatalities across attacks over time. What we find when we analyse the fatalities-
to-variability ratios for individual terrorist groups is that it is very difficult for terrorist groups to generate and 
maintain a relatively high fatalities-to-variability ratio over time and, in general, the fatalities-to-variability 
ratios of terrorist groups are quite low. For the period 2000 to 2008, the average fatalities-to-variability ratio or 
risk adjusted capability to inflict fatalities through an act of terrorism of the ten groups with the highest ratio in 
each year was 0.7847 fatalities per unit of variability. The majority of the 400 or more terrorist groups that were 
active during this time recorded much lower fatalities-to-variability ratios. The ten groups with the highest ratios 
in 2008 are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Highest Fatalities-to-Variability Ratios, 2008, Monthly Data5. 
Terrorist Group Fatalities-to-Variability Ratio 
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M) 1.245 
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq 1.179 
New People's Army (NPA) 0.990 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 0.928 
Taliban 0.907 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 0.863 
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) 0.726 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 0.721 
Al-Shabaab 0.651 
 
The lone wolf terrorist also must confront the trade-off between the average number of fatalities he can expect 
to inflict and the risk that the actual outcomes of his terrorist actions may be quite different from that which he 
expected. When terrorist operations are examined at the ‘group’ scale, it is found that terrorist groups find it 
difficult to generate and maintain a fatalities-to-variability ratio of greater than 1.00. Most groups are 
characterised by a ratio that is significantly lower than this and those groups that do manage to generate a higher 
ratio cannot do so persistently over time. At the smallest scale of terrorist operation at the level of the individual 
terrorist, the story is different. If the lone wolf terrorists that were active in the United States during the period 
1960 to 2009 were treated as an ‘unconnected group’ the fatalities-to-variability ratio recorded by the group for 
the entire period is 0.7510, indicating that the aggregate of terrorist activity perpetrated by America’s lone wolf 
terrorists inflicted a higher average number of fatalities per unit of variability than most of the terrorist groups 
contained within the GTD. This is important because terrorist groups, perhaps having recognised the 
diseconomies that we have been talking about, encourage individuals who share a similar ideology to participate 
in lone wolf terrorism (MEMRI, 2012).  
 
The possibility that the fatalities-to-variability (or risk-reward trade-off) is more effectively managed at a 
smaller scale of terrorist operation is also reflected in the summary statistics for the attack method category, 
‘armed attacks’ within the RAND-MIPT transnational terrorism database. Across the period 1968 to 2008, the 
average number of fatalities per ‘armed attack’ was 5.32 and variability (standard deviation) 15.00 fatalities per 
attack per year. The fatalities-to-variability ratio of ‘armed attacks’ was 0.3546. Many of the lone wolf terrorists 
who were active in the United States over the same period engaged acts of violence that would be categorised as 
‘armed attacks’, especially shootings or shooting sprees. In ‘armed attacks’—with assassinations and bombings 
removed from the dataset—America’s lone wolf terrorists inflicted an average of 2.63 fatalities per armed attack 
with variability 2.87 and a fatalities-to-variability ratio of 0.9157, almost two-and-a-half times the ratio that 
characterises the transnational ‘armed attacks’ perpetrated predominantly by terrorist groups. Although the 
armed attacks of the lone wolf terrorists could be expected to inflict about half as many fatalities as an act of 
transnational (group) terrorism of the same category, the outcomes were characterised by about one-fifth the 
amount of variability across the different lone wolf terrorists’ actions. The armed attacks perpetrated by lone 
wolf terrorists were fifty percent as deadly but eighty percent more certain (less variable).  
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On average, if a lone wolf terrorist is successful in engaging in an act of violence, the outcome is both more 
deadly and more certain than would be the case for many of the terrorist groups contained within the GTD. Both 
the size distribution of terrorist groups and the relative capability of the aggregate of lone wolf terrorists in the 
United States to inflict a level of fatality with less uncertainty than terrorist groups point towards the conclusion 
that the terrorism context is characterised by diseconomies of scale. If this is so and if the terrorism context 
reflects over time some tendency towards an optimal size distribution of terrorist operation, lone wolf terrorism 
may be expected to become a more prominent feature of the terrorism context. Because of the lone wolf’s 
common modus operandi of engaging in a ‘single spree of violence’ governments and security agencies may be 
advised to view the individual lone wolf as the subject of investigation whilst viewing the aggregate of single-
attack (or spree) and serial-attack lone wolves not as a disconnected set of individuals and outcomes but as an 
unconnected group emerging from the nature of the economies that characterise the scale at which terrorism is 
most optimally undertaken.   
 
THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHOICES OF THE LONE WOLF TERRORIST 
Economics is especially well-suited to the analysis of autonomous individual choice. In fact, even when defence 
economists analyse terrorist groups they often make use of the ‘representative agent’ theoretical device which 
effectively treats the group as a single independent decision-maker. Even so, the lone wolf terrorist presents 
significant analytical challenges if we wish to push beyond a statement of the obvious—for example, that the 
lone wolf terrorist can be analysed within a rational choice framework where he is viewed as making his choices 
in a manner that maximises his expected utility—and obtain results that are relevant to policymakers and, more 
importantly, law enforcement and security agencies engaged in investigative processes that aim to pre-empt or 
pursue particular lone wolf terrorists. Because the sociological-economic-psychological characteristics of lone 
wolf terrorists (and terrorists in general) have yet to yield discernible and reliable patterns, abstracting from the 
standard constituents of a potential lone wolf ‘profile’, as economic analysis is predisposed to do, will not 
abstract from as much analytical detail as might be expected and, what is more, may open new perspectives onto 
lone wolf terrorist behaviour that allows us to extract more from our existing catalogue of sociological-
economic-psychological characteristics than has been the case up til now.  
 
At the most fundamental level, the economic analysis of the lone wolf terrorist would proceed by writing down 
an expected utility function that encompasses the particular opportunities and choices that have been deemed 
pertinent to the analysis. This type of approach follows Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) who were among the 
first economists to use expected utility theory to investigate crime and criminal behaviour. Within defence 
economics, Landes (1978) is one of the earliest examples of an application of this traditional theoretical 
framework to a type of terrorist behaviour. Landes (1978) analysed hijacking. Similar approaches have been 
taken to the analysis of other types of terrorist activity, especially those involving negotiations or bargaining 
(Sandler et al., 1983, Sandler and Scott, 1987, Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009). Landes describes the 
opportunities and choices of the hijacker with the expected utility function: 
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Here the hijacker’s expected utility depends upon the probability of apprehension in country i, 
a
P , the 
probability (given apprehension) of being convicted and sentenced to prison, 
c
P , the hijacker’s wealth, 
i
W and 
j
W , in each of two countries, i and j, the monetary equivalent of the sentence, S, in country i and the monetary 
costs, C, associated with apprehension but no sentence (example, costs of defending oneself at trial). In Landes’ 
(1978) model, the potential hijacker’s opportunities are two-fold: (1) hijack; (2) do not hijack. The potential 
hijacker’s choice will be the one that maximises his expected utility. If the government takes steps to increase 
the probability of apprehension and conviction it will decrease the expected utility of hijacking and we should 
see a decline in the number of hijackings undertaken. Landes’ (1978) empirical analysis revealed that such 
security initiatives as placing air marshals on flights, installing metal detectors at airports, arranging for 
hijackers to be extradited back to the United States and substantially increasing the prison sentences imposed on 
hijackers were significant in bringing about a rapid decline in the number of hijackings undertaken in the United 
States. On the face of it, the expected utility analysis appeared to be quite good at explaining the behaviour of 
potential hijackers. Given their particular objective, which was usually to obtain money or get to Cuba, hijackers 
had previously found that hijacking ranked higher (had a higher expected utility) than doing something else 
(encompassed by a broad ‘do not hijack’ in Landes’ model). Following several steps by the U.S. government, 
this ranking was reversed.  
 
All of this sort of analytical work must be careful not to fall prey to the same criticisms that have been directed 
at Becker’s work (Blaug, 1992, especially p. 223). If we can use expected utility theory to obtain the prediction 
that hijacking will decrease when air marshals are put on planes, metal detectors are put in airports and harsher 
prison sentences are put in place and then we test that theoretical prediction empirically and find that it was 
indeed the case that a decrease in hijacking followed these particular security measures, have we proven 
anything at all? Aren’t such a theory and its empirical verification somewhat banal? The line is a very fine one 
and Blaug (1992) points out that Becker might have crossed it in his later work, though not necessarily his work 
on crime and criminal behaviour. What prevents analysis like Landes’ (1978) from slipping into banality is the 
fact that the analysis explains why we see a decline in attempted hijackings and not simply an increase in the 
number of hijackers being apprehended. That is, the analysis explains the ‘weighing up’ that potential hijackers 
do and predicts changes to the results of that weighing up when they are confronted with changed 
circumstances. When there are changes to the payoffs, potential hijackers reorder their preferences away from 
hijacking and do not even attempt it. It is not the case that they simply proceed as usual and get caught in greater 
numbers.  
 
It is the case that the opportunities and choices of the lone wolf terrorist could be cast in terms of the ‘full’ 
expected utility analysis of the type used by Landes (1978). The analysis of the lone wolf within such a 
theoretical framework presents two main obstacles. First, a full expected utility analysis requires payoff and 
probability estimates for each outcome under consideration. Even if we concentrated on a particular attack 
method or target type, this would be a difficult task. Second, the individuality of the lone wolf and the absence 
of a clearly discernible ‘archetypal’ profile mean that any attempts to develop a full expected utility analysis 
around particular motivations, attack methods and targets (to name but a few aspects of the terrorism context) 
must always verge on the boundary between pure formalism and useful analysis. Rather than a full expected 
utility analysis of a particular scenario, we may find it useful to concentrate our efforts on a broader set of 
opportunities and choices and the alternative to ‘full’ expected utility analysis called mean-variance utility 
analysis. One of the most important choices that the lone wolf makes is his choice of attack method. The attack 
method that he chooses plays a part in determining the outcomes of his terrorist actions. The most immediate 
outcome of terrorism is the fatalities and injuries that it inflicts on civilians. It is possible to define the 
opportunities and choices of the lone wolf terrorist with respect to attack methods and the fatalities and injuries 
expected to result from the deployment of those attack methods.  
 
This approach depicts the lone wolf as choosing attack methods on the basis of the fatalities and injuries that he 
expects to inflict and the possibility that the actual outcome diverges (higher or lower) from that which he 
expected. Terrorists, through word and deed, have indicated their intention to inflict fatalities and injuries 
through violent acts. For example, the man arrested for plotting a metro bombing in Washington had told 
contacts that he planned to kill as many people as possible (AFP, 2010). Although the infliction of fatalities and 
injuries might be a subsidiary goal that is correlated with some more final goal, such as press coverage, it is 
clear that the actions of terrorists are designed to inflict a level of human tragedy. Furthermore, this cannot be 
undertaken without bearing the risk that the actual amount of human tragedy that is inflicted is less than or 
greater than that which was expected. If we look at attack method choice through this analytical lens, we see a 
much more delineated set of opportunities from which the lone wolf can choose. There are not more than ten 
attack method categories
6
. Each represents an opportunity to inflict human tragedy and each is attended by the 
risk that the actual outcomes will be different from the expected outcomes. The lone wolf weighs the different 
opportunities in terms of the expected outcomes and the risk that the actual outcomes will be different. The ‘full’ 
expected utility analysis is collapsed into an analytical framework of risk versus reward. Our rewards could be 
anything that conveys positive utility to a terrorist. This could be press coverage. We have chosen the immediate 
outcome of terrorism as the unit of analysis: fatalities and injuries.  
 
The expected utility function that describes the lone wolf’s opportunities and choices across all attack methods 
is one that contains just the two moments of the distribution (mean and standard deviation) of the fatalities 
expected to result from a single attack method or a combination of attack methods: 
 
 
FF
EfU  ,            (2) 
 
The lone wolf chooses his attack method (or combination of attack methods) on the basis of the fatalities that he 
expects to inflict and the variability of those outcomes. We must not think that the lone wolf will find it difficult 
to determine approximately what the possible outcomes of his actions will be. The press coverage of terrorist 
incidences is comprehensive and there is a significant amount of information about both successful and failed 
attacks embedded within such coverage that may calibrate expectations with regards to the possible outcomes of 
a particular type of attack. The utility function, equation (2), depicts the lone wolf as trading off expected 
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fatalities against variability. If we applied this to Landes’ (1978) hijacking analysis, our expected utility analysis 
would be much simpler and we would not need probability estimates for each outcome. Instead of ordering his 
different opportunities on the basis of an expected utility computed over the probabilities of all possible 
outcomes and their associated utility, equation (2) says that the lone wolf will order his different opportunities 
(attack methods) on the basis of the expected fatalities and the variability of the possible outcomes. Both of 
these things are inferred from the ‘averages’ that the lone wolf might reasonably be expected to see reflected in 
the publicly available information regarding the outcomes of actual and attempted acts of terrorism. In turn, this 
allows our analysis to be based on historical data without the need for further inferences regarding the possible 
outcomes and their probabilities.  
 
THE LONE WOLF TERRORIST’S ATTACK METHODS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHOICES 
The RAND-MIPT transnational terrorism database lists several attack method categories that encompass acts of 
transnational terrorism perpetrated since the late 1960s. When trying to obtain data that may be used to analyse 
the opportunities and choices of the lone wolf, the transnational terrorism database emerges as the most 
appropriate starting point. The number of lone wolf terrorists is relatively small and their attacks relatively 
idiosyncratic (with the notable exception of the shootings and shooting sprees). The complete historical record 
of terrorist incidences such as that contained within the GTD includes many attacks that are not relevant to the 
analysis of the lone wolf’s opportunities and choices. In particular, attacks on civilians in a war-torn region such 
as Iraq or Afghanistan are not reflective of the outcomes that a lone wolf terrorist is likely to achieve in attacks 
undertaken in Western countries. So the RAND-MIPT database on transnational terrorism is the most extensive 
record of terrorist incidences that most accurately reflects the fatalities and injuries that a lone wolf terrorist 
could expect to inflict if he deploys an attack method that is encompassed within one of the attack method 
categories covered by the database. Each attack method category has an expected number of fatalities and 
injuries and each expected amount of human tragedy is accompanied by a variability that reflects the risk that 
the actual outcomes of such a type of attack may diverge from those which were expected.  
 
Table 4. Attack Type, Fatalities and Variability of Outcomes7. 
Attack Type 
Average Fatalities and 
Injuries Per Attack Per 
Year 
Standard 
Deviation 
Armed Attacks 5.32 15.00 
Arson 0.72 1.85 
Assassination 1.54 0.71 
Hostage 11.46 38.18 
Bombing 5.88 6.09 
Hijacking 3.91 10.82 
Kidnapping 0.46 0.35 
Other 1.14 3.02 
Unconventional 7.48 42.94 
Unknown 1.11 4.04 
 
                                                 
7
 Data Source: Calculations made using the data contained in the RAND-MIPT transnational terrorism database.  
When the level of analysis is ‘attack method’ the same statistical structure is evident as that which manifests 
itself in the aggregate fatalities-to-variability ratios—a positive relationship between inflicted fatalities and 
variability. Just like the terrorist groups whose actions populate the historical record of terrorism, the lone wolf 
terrorist faces a trade-off between the number of fatalities he can expect to inflict with a particular attack method 
and the possibility that the actual outcome will be different from his expectation. The opportunities that the lone 
wolf has to inflict human tragedy are contained within Table 4. In essence, these opportunities are ‘pairs’ of 
fatalities and variability. If he chooses an attack method that is expected to inflict a higher amount of human 
tragedy, he must bear the greater risk that his attack method will inflict more or less human tragedy than he 
expected. If he wants a more certain outcome, he must choose an attack method with a lower expected amount 
of human tragedy. Something that is particularly important to consider, though, is the case where the lone wolf 
terrorist can combine attack methods. This is difficult for the lone wolf terrorist to do, particularly at short 
horizons or, at the limit, simultaneously. A terrorist group can allocate its resources across different attack 
methods and deploy terrorist operatives to undertake different types of attack simultaneously. A lone wolf as a 
single individual cannot easily do this. However, Anders Breivik did manage to combine ‘bombing’ and ‘armed 
attack’, making use of a timed bombing device to enable him diversify his strategy by combining two different 
attack methods. When attack methods are able to be combined, a feature of the same statistical structure that is 
manifested in a positive fatalities-to-variability relationship emerges with a great deal of significance for the 
risk-reward trade-off. This feature of the statistical structure is the correlation between the fatalities generated by 
the different attack methods.  
 
Because the correlation between the outcomes of the attack methods is imperfect, the terrorist may inflict more 
fatalities per unit of risk than law enforcement would expect if they did not take into consideration the imperfect 
correlation and the lone wolf’s potential, though limited, ability to combine imperfectly correlated attack 
methods together in an overall terrorist strategy. Rather than a linear ‘list’ of attack methods, the lone wolf 
terrorist may choose from a non-linear or concave set of attack methods and combinations of attack methods. 
The fact that the opportunity set confronting terrorists is concave rather than linear was identified by Phillips 
(2009). The critically important feature of a concave set of opportunities is that the expected payoffs at each 
level of variability are higher than they would be if all the payoffs to the different attack methods were perfectly 
positively correlated. There are gains, measured in terms of higher expected payoffs per unit of variability, that 
are obtainable through combining two or more attack methods together. When you compute the average number 
of fatalities and variability for every possible combination of the attack methods listed in Table 4 and plot those 
attack methods or combinations that have the highest expected payoff at each level of variability, the result is a 
concave set.  
 
 Fig. 1. The Lone Wolf’s Opportunity Set (Based on RAND-MIPT Data) 
 
An important question can now be answered with the assistance of economic analysis. When making his 
decision on the basis of expected fatalities and variability, in what order of preference will the lone wolf place 
the attack methods listed in Table 4? Which attack method (or combination of attack methods) is the lone wolf 
terrorist’s best-ranked choice from the available opportunities? The standard approach in economics is to 
determine the ‘optimal’ or ‘rational’ choice or the one that maximises expected utility. This has been criticised 
both within and without of the economics discipline but there is reason to expect this approach to be somewhat 
more useful to us within the context that we have been considering. In this context, a choice from the set of 
attack method opportunities whose risks and payoffs are presented in Figure 1 will be the most dangerous 
choice. By making the fatalities that are expected to be inflicted by an act of terrorism the key variable in the 
terrorist’s objective function, we equate the terrorist’s most dangerous choice with the optimal one of economic 
analysis. If the terrorist errs, as well he might, he will inflict less fatalities per unit of risk than we were prepared 
for. This is much better than the inverse scenario where we expect the terrorist to choose sub-optimally and 
essentially rule out the worst possible outcomes.  
 
Any choice from the concave set of opportunities presented in Figure 1 will be optimal in the sense that such a 
choice will have the highest expected number of fatalities at its particular level of risk or variability. Although 
the number of ‘points on the line’ in Figure 1 is infinite, certain attack methods and combinations of attack 
methods emerge as dominant optimal choices over particular ranges of the opportunity set. The range which is 
inhabited by the lone wolf terrorist will depend on his preference for risk. If he is more averse to risk, he will 
inhabit a range in the south-western region of the opportunity set, whereas if he is less averse to risk or more 
risk seeking he will inhabit a range in the north-eastern region of the set. In each range, particular attack 
methods dominate the others.  
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 Fig. 2. Dominant Attack Methods at Different Risk Ranges. 
 
The range that the lone wolf terrorist inhabits will depend on his risk preference. It is almost certainly the case 
that terrorists, including lone wolf terrorists, are risk averse rather than risk seeking. A terrorist who is averse to 
risk will allocate his resources to more risky terrorist attack methods only if he receives a commensurate 
increase in the payoffs that he can expect to yield on average. A risk seeking terrorist would allocate all of his 
resources to the single riskiest attack method. This type of behaviour is seldom, if ever, observed. If we take the 
historical record of lone wolf terrorism as our guide, we know that most lone wolf terrorists have chosen either 
assassination, bombing and armed attacks as their attack methods. This indicates a medium-high level of risk 
aversion. Although this does not rule out the possibility of the emergence of a lone wolf characterised by a much 
lower level of risk aversion, it does give us an indication of the risk ranges that have usually been inhabited by 
lone wolves in the past. The lone wolf terrorist is most likely to be a relatively risk-averse individual. When he 
engages in violence, his optimal attack methods choices are assassination at the highest level of risk aversion 
and armed attacks and bombing at medium levels of risk aversion. His expected number of fatalities per attack is 
no more than 7.00 but the outcomes of his attacks exhibit a relatively small amount of variability. This 
highlights the threat of the lone wolf. The challenge facing law enforcement is to prevent the lone wolf from 
striking. Once his attack commences, it is unlikely that it will end without a level of harm being inflicted upon 
his victims.  
 
PURSUING THE LONE WOLF TERRORIST 
The investigative process that is applied to lone wolf terrorism must address two challenges: (1) the pre-emption 
of the lone wolf terrorist; and (2) the pursuit of the lone wolf terrorist if he strikes and remains at large. Aspects 
of the economic analysis of the lone wolf terrorist may contribute to both stages of the investigative process. 
The pre-emption of the lone wolf is extremely challenging but it is in just such a context that even small 
contributions may be important. The ways in which economic analysis may be used to delineate the lone wolf’s 
opportunities and choices provide a new perspective to the problem. It is unlikely, for example, that without 
economic analysis to provide such an insight that law enforcement would be aware that the terrorist’s 
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opportunity set is characterised by higher expected payoffs per unit of variability when attack methods can be 
combined, though they might have had an intuition to that effect based on cumulative experience in law 
enforcement and the observation of the outcomes of terrorist attacks. Similarly, economic theoretical 
frameworks may prove to be useful in that part of the investigative process that is designed to identify, pursue 
and apprehend a lone wolf terrorist who has struck and who remains at large. In this case, the type of attack 
method that the lone wolf has chosen will provide insights into the amount of variability or risk he is willing to 
bear and, in turn, the type of risk aversion that most likely characterises him.  
 
Risk preference is a fundamental and critically important part of the analysis of behaviour under conditions of 
risk and uncertainty. Analysis of terrorist behaviour that does not take risk preference into account will overlook 
many of the most important aspects of terrorist decision-making. For example, it is the conventional wisdom 
that concessions by the government to a terrorist group will make that terrorist group more risk seeking and 
more likely to engage in additional and more intense acts of violence. However, the matter is not so clear cut. 
Sandler et al. (1983), Atkinson et al. (1987) and Lapan and Sandler (1988) have shown that the ‘never negotiate’ 
position is not always optimal. Work on incentives structures in other parts of economics, especially Ross 
(2004) and attempts to bring this work within the purview of the defence economics literature (see Phillips and 
Pohl 2012), have shown that an increase in government concessions does not unambiguously decrease terrorist 
risk aversion and, in fact, might even increase it under certain conditions. The outcome depends on both the type 
and level of risk aversion that characterises the terrorist or terrorist group. When the lone wolf’s choices are the 
subject of analysis, his level of risk aversion and the type of risk aversion that he exhibits are important 
considerations. He may be more or less risk averse. His level of risk aversion may be high or low. He may 
exhibit increasing, decreasing or constant relative risk aversion as the outcomes of his terrorist actions unfold 
and accumulate. His type of risk aversion may be increasing, decreasing and constant.  
 
We have spoken of the lone wolf ordering his preferences on the basis of expected utility. The traditional 
approach in orthodox economic science is to treat this preference ordering process formally by assuming that the 
individual behaves as if he ‘computes’ the expected utility of each of his opportunities. The individual is 
assumed to apply his expected utility function to this process. Economics makes use of a small number of 
expected utility functions: quadratic, logarithmic, exponential and power. Each has different mathematical 
properties that reflect different ways in which risky opportunities are weighed up and choices made. Within 
economic science, the von Neumann-Morgenstern (NM) (1944) axioms for rational choice are accorded a good 
deal of significance. Preference orderings across opportunities are viewed as ‘rational’ if they are consistent 
with the NM axioms. The mean-variance expected utility analysis introduced in the previous section yields a 
preference order that is approximate to a full expected utility analysis but will only be guaranteed to be 
consistent with the NM axioms if the payoffs are distributed normally or if expected utility is quadratic. The 
quadratic expected utility function has a place of prominence within the development of mean-variance 
expected utility analysis. It should be noted, however, that a mean-variance preference ordering will 
approximate an ordering determined by a full expected utility analysis even when payoffs are not normally 
distributed and when utility is not quadratic. Much has been made of the properties of quadratic utility in some 
parts of the financial economics literature but it does not alter the fact that the method provides a 
computationally tractable preference ordering that will approximate a full expected utility analysis which will 
likely be much more burdensome to compute. In any case, the quadratic utility function approximates a broader 
class of functions (Elton et al. 2003, p. 220).  
 
If the lone wolf terrorist’s preference ordering process can be assumed to be exactly or approximately described 
by a quadratic expected utility function, it follows that the lone wolf may be expected to be characterised by a 
particular type of risk aversion. The quadratic expected utility function may be written as: 
 
    2101 RbRbRU            (3) 
 
The utility function simply relates utility or satisfaction with whatever contributes to it, either positively or 
negatively. In equation (3), the terrorist’s expected utility depends upon the payoffs or rewards to terrorism, R. 
Since R is a ‘good’, increases in R increase expected utility. However, variability or risk is ‘bad’ and increases 
in risk decrease expected utility (i.e. 01 b ). The quadratic utility function has several interesting properties. 
First, the function exhibits increasing risk aversion. As the terrorist’s actions accumulate fatalities over time, he 
allocates less resources (including time) to terrorism. Second, and more interesting, the terrorist can become 
satiated within a relatively narrow range of payoffs. Satiation means that a point is reached where more of 
something is not preferred. In this context, past some point more fatalities are no longer preferred to less and the 
terrorist may drift away from terrorist activity for some period of time. For most other utility functions, more is 
always preferred to less and the fact that the quadratic function allows for the opposite case has been the main 
point of criticism directed towards it and mean-variance analysis. Of course, in the context of terrorism it would 
be unwise to accept uncritically a conclusion that emerged from shortcomings attending the application of the 
quadratic utility function to a context that was solely concerned with monetary gain (investor behaviour) and 
where satiation was less easy to understand.  
 
Phillips (2011) and Phillips and Pohl (2012) discuss the case of Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber) with 
reference to mean-variance utility, the quadratic expected utility function and the tendency of the terrorist to 
come and go from the terrorism context as fatalities accumulate over time. Kaczynski is a prominent example of 
what may be called ‘serial’ lone wolf terrorism, which may be contrasted with ‘spree’ lone wolf terrorism. 
Unlike the ‘spree’ lone wolf who engages in a time-concentrated act of violence such as a shooting spree, the 
serial lone wolf is more akin to the serial killer in the sense that he engages and withdraws from terrorism and 
may continue his attacks for extended periods if he is not apprehended. Kaczynski engaged in a series of 
bombings over two decades. Between 1978 and 1995, Kaczynski mailed sixteen parcel and letter-bombs to 
various targets around the United States. In May 1978, Kaczynski apparently left a parcel in the parking lot of 
the University of Illinois at Chicago. On the parcel, Kaczynski had written as the return address the address of a 
materials engineering professor who worked at Northwestern University at Evanston, Illinois. The parcel was 
found and sent by mail to the return address. When the parcel was received campus police were alerted. When a 
campus police officer attempted to open the parcel it exploded causing minor injuries.  
 
In each of the years 1978 to 1982, Kaczynski engaged in terrorism at least once. Following two attacks in 1982 
that caused severe injuries to a secretary and a professor at Vanderbilt University (in Tennessee) and University 
of California (Berkeley), Kaczynski faded away and did not engage in violent terrorism for almost three years. 
His most deadly attacks occurred after his re-emergence in 1985. In May 1985, a graduate student at Berkeley 
was severely injured when he opened a parcel containing a bomb. In November, Kaczynski mailed another 
device to the home of biologist James McConnell in Michigan. Both McConnell and his research assistant were 
injured when the package was opened. The very next month, Kaczynski left a bomb in the parking lot of a 
computer store in Sacramento, California. The store’s owner was killed. Two months later another computer 
store owner was severely injured by a device left in the parking lot of his store in Salt Lake City, Utah. This was 
Kaczynski’s last attack for six years.    
 
The Unabomber re-emerged again in 1993. Over the next three years, Kaczynski would attack four more times. 
On June 22 and June 24 1993, a geneticist at the University of California and a professor of computer science at 
Yale in New Haven, Connecticut were injured by parcels sent by Kaczynski. Almost eighteen months later, in 
December 1994, an advertising executive became Kaczynski’s second fatality when he opened a parcel bomb 
that was delivered to his home. In April 1995, a timber industry lobbyist was killed when he opened a parcel 
addressed to the president of the California Forestry Association. In the same month, Kaczynski contacted The 
New York Times. In the letter that he sent to the newspaper, Kaczynski stated that he would cease his violent 
terrorist activities if the paper published his manifesto. The Unabomber Manifesto, Industrial Society and Its 
Future, was published by The New York Times and The Washington Post in 1995. Kaczynski’s brother 
recognised the ideas contained in the manifesto as belonging to or being similar to those held by his brother. The 
Unabomber was arrested in April 1996 at his remote cabin in Montana. 
 
If we were asked, before the Unabomber was identified, to list some points relevant to the unknown suspect’s 
profile that emerge from the economic analysis of lone wolf terrorism (with risk, reward and quadratic utility) 
we would be able to say that the Unabomber’s choice of attack method—parcel bombings—is more akin to 
assassination than bombing in terms of its ‘targetedness’. This would place the suspect in the higher range of 
risk aversion and lead us to believe that he would continue to involve himself in attacks where the outcomes did 
not exhibit a great deal of variability. Because of the need to find low-reward-low-risk targets at which to deploy 
his attack methods, the suspect will need to drift from place to place and he is unlikely to be found in the 
vicinity of his attacks. Of course, parcel bombing is suited to such a modus operandi. As fatalities accumulate, 
he is likely, because of his increasing risk aversion, to allocate fewer resources to terrorism and more resources 
to other activities or forms of political expression. Because of his quadratic utility, he is likely to be easily 
satiated at intervals, especially after a series of successful attacks (or a single very successful attack). At such 
times, he may discontinue his involvement in terrorism, allowing ‘time diversification’ between terrorism and 
other activities to regain a semblance of balance. The ‘engage and withdraw’ type of serial lone wolf terrorism 
exemplified by Kaczynski is reflected in the types of choice behaviour embedded within our economic analysis. 
This, however, is never going to be a case of perfect match and economic analysis, like investigative psychology 
and offender profiling, will require a mixture of pragmatism and law enforcement experience in order to be 
effective at the operational level.  
 THE ‘COPY CAT’ LONE WOLF TERRORIST ACT 
The mean-variance or risk-reward approach to analysing the opportunities and choices of the lone wolf terrorist 
is, because of its computable results regarding opportunities and preference orderings, more capable of yielding 
operationally relevant advice for law enforcement and security agencies than the more computationally 
burdensome full expected utility analysis. However, the mean-variance approach is still more or less orthodox 
from the viewpoint of those critics of economic theory and rational choice. Over the past forty years there have 
been significant advances in the analysis of choice from a behavioural or psychological perspective 
(DellaVigna, 2009). Of special note is the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979 and 1992). Kaheman and 
Tversky’s ‘prospect theory’ is an alternative to expected utility analysis in which preference orderings over 
‘lotteries’ are determined by the application of a more complicated probability weighting scheme that accounts 
for many of the violations from the axioms of expected utility theory that have been observed in experimental 
economics laboratories.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 265) discuss a series of examples of violations
 
of the axioms of expected 
utility theory in hypothetical choice scenarios. All of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, pp. 265-271) results 
indicate that people do not weight the utilities of outcomes by their probabilities and therefore violate one of the 
principles of expected utility theory. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory is perhaps the most 
prominent of several models of choice that propose an alternative to the probability weighting scheme of 
orthodox expected utility theory. Other weighting schemes are discussed by Machina (1987). In attempting to 
develop an alternative model, Kahneman and Tversky assume that there are two phases in the choice process. 
First, people are assumed to edit or frame prospects so as to simplify evaluation and choice between prospects. 
It is during the editing or framing phase, as people grapple with the choice problem and try to simplify it, that 
some of the anomalies such as the ‘isolation effect’ are presumed to enter into the choice process. After editing, 
people are assumed to evaluate (rank) the prospects and choose the prospect with the highest value (utility). As 
such, the functional form for the preference function is non-linear:  
 
     ipixvV            (4) 
 
In equation (5), the value V of a prospect is expressed in terms of v and π. Both v and π are scales which, 
respectively, (1) measures the value of deviations (gains and losses) from a reference point; and (2) associates 
with each probability p a decision weight π(p) that reflects the impact of p on the overall value of the prospect 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p.275). This setup enables the authors to assume, in light of their experimental 
results, that values are attached to deviations or changes from some reference point rather than to final states and 
that decision weights do not coincide with stated probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p.277). As an 
alternative to expected utility theory, prospect theory has enjoyed significant attention in the literature (Kim et 
al. 2006). From the point of view of terrorism research, the ‘reference point’ and the relevance of ‘losses’ 
against the reference point are likely to be the most significant features of prospect theory. This has been 
recognised in the context of bargaining problems by Butler (2007) who explores the implications for the 
outcomes of strategic bargaining interactions when players’ behaviour is described by prospect theory and 
different reference points such as the ‘status quo’ are important to the players.  
 
Another way to apply prospect theory in terrorism research is by making use of the idea that the outcomes of 
previous acts of terrorism may be used as reference points by terrorists contemplating a future action. This 
approach would be relevant to existing work undertaken by terrorism researchers that involves the analysis of 
situations where terrorists may be thought to reference their actions or demands against those of other terrorists, 
past outcomes or recent events and may complement research that has used contest theory to examine terrorist 
behaviour (Caruso and Schneider, 2013; Caruso and Locatelli, 2008). We might guess, for example, that a 
terrorist who seizes hostages may not be satisfied with a ransom of $12 million if he knows that another terrorist 
group was able to extract a ransom of $25 million during a recent comparable hostage-taking incident. Prospect 
theory provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of the effect of this type of consideration on the 
decisions of the terrorist. It may be particularly useful, as we discuss, to situations where a terrorist is driven to 
emulate or copy the actions of a predecessor.  
 
‘Copy cat’ acts of violence are something that must be taken into consideration when assessing the threat of lone 
wolf terrorism. Prospect theory allows us to obtain a preference ordering over the available opportunities—
attack methods—that takes into account the possibility that the potential lone wolf terrorist assesses each 
opportunity not on the basis of some final outcome (for example, total number of fatalities) but with reference to 
some specific number of fatalities recorded by a predecessor lone wolf whom he seeks to emulate. With regard 
to ‘copy cat’ acts of violence, the behaviour that is most directly relevant to acts of lone wolf terrorism, 
particularly when those acts take the form of sprees of violence, is the behaviour of ‘school shooters’. Robertz 
(2007) reports that perpetrators of ‘school shootings’ frequently “...state a desire to do it [the spree] ‘better’ than 
their predecessors—which generally means killing even more people.”  
 
Let us consider the cases of Kaczynski, whose actions have already been detailed, and Anders Behring Breivik. 
In Norway in July 2011 Breivik engaged in a bombing and shooting spree that resulted in the deaths of 77 
people. The attacks were undertaken in two parts. First, a car bomb was left outside the government building 
that housed the offices of the Prime Minister. The bomb was detonated and killed eight people. This is exactly 
what would be expected from an ‘average’ bombing attack. Breivik then travelled approximately 40 kilometres 
to a youth camp where he murdered another 69 people in an hour-long shooting spree. For a terrorist attack that 
might be categorised as an ‘armed assault’, 69 fatalities is many standard deviations from the mean number of 
fatalities historically generated in such attacks
8
. If Kaczynski is a prominent example of ‘serial’ lone wolf 
terrorism then Breivik is certainly the archetypal example of ‘spree’ lone wolf terrorism. The question that we 
wish to answer concerns the attack methods that would be chosen by an individual seeking to emulate the 
actions of either Kaczynski or Breivik. Prospect theory can answer this question if we determine the prospect 
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 What might be required is some estimate of an expected number of injuries and fatalities from shooting sprees in confined 
locations, such as schools, campuses or youth camps. The injuries and fatalities inflicted by lone shooters (though not 
necessarily lone wolf terrorists) have sometimes been very substantial. The mean and standard deviation of the injuries and 
fatalities inflicted by such specialised armed attacks may represent the statistical foundation for a new attack method 
category.   
value (utility) of the alternative attack methods with reference to the number of fatalities inflicted by Kaczynski 
and Breivik.  
 
Although Kaczynski inflicted an accumulated total of 23 injuries and fatalities, when considered individually his 
attacks inflicted a single injury or fatality. A potential lone wolf who would seek to emulate Kaczynski’s parcel 
bombing campaign may operate against a reference point of 1 or 2 for each single attack. The total injuries and 
fatalities inflicted by Breivik during a time-concentrated spree were 228. We seek to determine how a potential 
lone wolf seeking to emulate the actions of either Kaczynski or Breivik would order his preferences over the 
attack methods encompassed by the RAND-MIPT attack method categories. This analysis involves computing 
the prospect values for each attack method using 1, 2, 23 and 228 as reference points. Using the mean and 
standard deviation (Table 4) and assuming a normal distribution, the probabilities and the cumulative 
probabilities for each number of injuries and fatalities per attack per year are computed for each attack method
9
. 
Each of the probabilities are then weighted to find  ip . Using a particular reference point, the change in x is 
computed for each level of injury and fatality. If, for example, the reference point is 3, then the change in x for 2 
injuries and fatalities is – 1. The result is a set of values for the various changes in x (above and below the 
reference point). The final step is multiply each of these values by the weighted probabilities as in equation (5) 
and sum to find the value or utility of the prospect. 
 
The preference orderings, based on prospect value, that emerge from the analysis are presented in Table 5 
below. The prospect values are ‘reference point dependent’ and the preference ordering changes depending on 
how the potential lone wolf references his attacks. If he were to reference his attacks to Kaczynski, we should 
expect him to choose either assassination or bombing (if those opportunities are available to him). On the other 
hand, if he references his attacks to Breivik, we should expect him to choose either bombing or armed attacks. 
This type of analysis may prove useful to the investigative process in cases where law enforcement believes 
there is a chance that a predecessor lone wolf’s actions may be emulated by an unknown suspect. For example, a 
suspect, who may be identified or unidentified, is known to be obsessed with the actions of a predecessor lone 
wolf. Under these conditions, if the suspect’s decision making is described by prospect theory10 and the 
predecessor’s outcomes are a salient reference point, prospect theory may provide some indication to law 
enforcement about the value or utility that the suspect may attach to particular attack methods. This may help to 
guide an investigation or the security initiatives undertaken by local law enforcement at potential targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The normality assumption is not as unjustifiable as it might seem. The data series we are considering is injuries and 
fatalities per attack per year not the ‘raw’ series of injuries and fatalities per year. 
10
 It may not be. That is why contributions from orthodox expected utility theory and mean-variance expected utility should 
be used in conjunction with each other to sketch several possible profiles for each offender.  
Table 5. Preference Orderings by Prospect Value: Highest to Lowest. 
Reference Point = 
1 Fatality 
Reference Point = 
2 Fatalities 
Reference Point = 
23 Injuries and 
Fatalities 
Reference Point = 
228 Injuries and Fatalities 
Assassination Bombing Bombing Bombing 
Bombing Assassination Armed Attacks Armed Attacks 
Kidnapping Hijacking Hijacking Hijacking 
Arson Armed Attacks Hostage Hostage 
Hijacking Hostage Unconventional Unconventional 
Armed Attacks Arson ‘Miscellaneous’ ‘Miscellaneous’ 
Hostage ‘Miscellaneous’ Arson Arson 
‘Miscellaneous’ Unconventional Assassination Assassination 
Unconventional Kidnapping Kidnapping Kidnapping 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Economics is about opportunities and choices. Economic analysis first of all delineates some set of opportunities 
from which the terrorist or terrorist group chooses and then proceeds to the analysis of the choice that is made 
from the opportunity set. Usually, this choice is the ‘rational’ or expected utility maximising choice but sub-
optimal choices are implicit within the delineated set of opportunities and these possible choices are not ignored. 
Indeed, there is nothing within economic analysis to say that the decision-maker always makes a perfect 
decision based on a complete calculation and weighing up of alternatives. However, it is easy to see why 
‘rational choice’ is the target of criticism. It is not always clear how it is relevant to actual decisions even if it is 
accepted that the ‘rational choice’ is a benchmark against which actual choices might be compared. This 
problem is mitigated considerably if we equate the rational choice with something meaningful and significant. 
Although we may have chosen any relevant payoff, we chose to analyse terrorist opportunities and choices from 
within a context where the fatalities inflicted by different attack methods are the main consideration of terrorist 
decision-maker. In such a context the set of rational or expected utility maximising opportunities is equivalent to 
the most damaging or dangerous opportunities. If we prepare, in this context, for a lone wolf who chooses 
optimally or rationally from his set of opportunities we are preparing for a lone wolf to choose the most deadly 
attack method combinations. It would seem unwise to forgo an analysis of these most dangerous opportunities 
on the basis of an ideological conclusion that ‘terrorists do not choose rationally’ and would therefore not 
choose them.  
 
Economic analysis in general may provide some insights into the terrorist’s logic of choice but it is economic 
analysis that provides or is based upon quantitative computable results that will be most effectively used in the 
investigative process. It is no good knowing that the terrorist chooses optimally (or not) unless we can at least 
narrow down his opportunities and choices. To do this necessitates a certain willingness to abstract from certain 
details and focus on a few key features of terrorism context. Our analysis focuses on a small list of key features: 
attack methods, expected fatalities and the risk that the actual outcome may diverge from that which was 
expected. Rather than try to figure out how the terrorist would order his attack method preferences if he were to 
apply a full expected utility analysis and weigh up all the payoffs and all the probabilities, we try to determine 
how the terrorist would order his attack method preferences if he makes an assessment of risk and reward. 
Terrorists could make such an assessment simply on the basis of what they see reported about different attacks. 
Such an analysis opens the way for a delineation of the terrorist’s opportunities as a set of risk-reward ‘pairs’ 
rather than a more complex amalgam of different characteristics. Furthermore, we can define the set of 
opportunities that dominate all others in terms of reward per unit of risk. A utility maximising terrorist would 
choose from this sub-set. His choice depends on his preference for risk. We can identify the attack methods that 
would be chosen by terrorists who are more risk averse as well as those that would be chosen by more risk 
seeking terrorists. Some attack methods, such as arson, are all but ruled out and are dominated by other attack 
methods at each level of risk.  
 
If we are willing to attach a particular expected utility function (and risk aversion parameter) to a lone wolf 
terrorist we can determine the terrorist’s utility maximising attack method choice with precision. However, 
attack methods are dominant over large enough ranges of the opportunity set to enable us to draw conclusions 
about the choices that would be made by particular types of terrorists without the need to make additional 
assumptions. At the lowest levels of risk and the highest levels of risk aversion, the lone wolf terrorist would 
choose assassination or a combination of assassination and bombing. At the highest levels of risk and the lowest 
levels of risk aversion, the lone wolf terrorist would choose ‘unconventional attacks’ or a combination of 
hostage-taking, unconventional attacks and bombing. What is most interesting about the opportunities available 
to the lone wolf is the concavity of the trade-off between risk and reward. This property of the opportunity set 
emerges from the imperfect correlations that characterise the payoffs to the different attack types and must not 
be overlooked by law enforcement for the simple reason that concavity implies higher average fatalities at each 
level of variability when compared to a linear non-concave opportunity set.  
 
When we turn our attention to the operational details of the investigative process we find that an economic 
analysis of opportunities and choices can be used to generate inferences about a lone wolf terrorist who has 
struck and who remains at large. The attack method that the lone wolf chose reveals something about him. 
Among other things, it reveals his preference for risk. If he has chosen an attack method that is characterised by 
a relatively lower variability of payoffs we may infer that he is more averse to risk. Further inferences flow, 
including the inference that he will not be found in the vicinity of his targets and that he will drift from location 
to location in order to continue his habitation of the low-risk-low-payoff sector of the opportunity set
11
. Similar 
pieces of investigative advice emerge from the application of behavioural economics, especially prospect theory, 
to the analysis of terrorism and terrorist behaviour. It cannot be ruled out that a potential lone wolf will be 
driven to copy the actions of a predecessor. If the predecessor’s actions become a reference point for the 
potential lone wolf, we may use prospect theory to determine how the potential lone wolf will order his 
preferences over the available attack methods in his act of emulation. In this way, economic analysis may 
contribute to the investigative process. When stripped to its barest fundamental features, economic analysis is 
                                                 
11
 This is distinct from actions taken to avoid being apprehended. If law enforcement efforts have been 
enhanced, the average payoff may be expected to have fallen and the risk-reward trade-off will no longer be 
appropriate. The lone wolf might need to move to another type of attack or another type of location in order to 
obtain his desired risk-reward trade-off.  
about opportunities and choices. Along with other analytical approaches, economic science can contribute to the 
investigative process designed to pre-empt or pursue the lone wolf terrorist.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure A.1 Average Fatalities and Variability: All Active Terrorist Groups 2000 to 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
